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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
LONNIE E. STRONG, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
JOHN W. TURNER, Warden, 




BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Lonnie E. Strong, appeals from the de-
nial of his writ of habeas corpus. 
D!S'POSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Based upon findings of fact, the Honorable Bryant H. 
Croft after conducting a hearing on appellant's petition con-
cluded that there was no "showing by clear and convincing 
evidence that there was a mentally coerced plea of guilty to 
the charge of robbery.'' The peti'tion was therefore dinied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits that the denial of appellant's peti-
tion for writ of habeas corpus in the Third District Court 
should be affirmed. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Lonnie H. Strong was sentenced to the Utah State 
Prison on September 22, 1965, following his plea of guilty 
to a charge of robbery. The defendant was represented by 
court-appointed counsel, Frank Hanson. Mr. Hanson con-
ferred with the defendant and his co-defendant for a short I 
time before the preliminary hearing and then conducted the 1
1 preliminary hearing in their behalf (T. 3-7). Later, at the 
I 
time of trial, Mr. Hanson recommended that the appellant I 
plead guilty to the charge based upon the state offer that 
the charges of attempt to escape and destruction of state 1 
property would not be filed by the state. At the hearing 
on the writ of habeas corpus, counsel for the petitioner had 
in his possession the transcript of the proceedings below 
but declined to submit it as evidence (T.14). The only evi-
dence submitted at the hearing was the testimony of the 
petitioner and his co-defendant, Charles Meredith. The · 
trial court found that the arrangement whereby the charge' I 
of attempted escape and destruction of state property were i 
not filed in return for the plea of guilty to the charge of 
robbery was not in and of itself adequate evidence to prove ;1· 





THE PRESENT APPEAL IS NOT SUBJECT: 
MATTER FOR AN EXTRAORDINARY WRIT sucH I 
AS HABEAS CORPUS BUT RATHER SUBJECT MAT ! 
TER FOR REGULAR AP PELLA TE REVIEW. I 
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The peetitioner is alleging that he is not guilty of the 
charge of robbery but rather of grand larceny at the most. 
The guilt of the petitioner is not a proper issue to be raised 
in this appeal nor is it proper subject matter for the grant-
ing of a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner is attempt-
ing to do what the Utah Supreme Court has previously ad-
dressed itself to and has ruled upon as in the case of Bryant 
v. Turner, 19 U.2d 284, 431 P.2d 121 (1967) wherein the court 
said· 
This proceeding is an attempt to do that which 
should not be done nor countenanced in our pro-
cedure: To turn habeas corpus into an appellate 
review ... After judgment is entered, there is 
assured a right of appeal with the proper time to 
seek redress for any such error of transgression 
of those rights, i.e., the rights of one accused of 
crime and safeguards against conviction of the in-
nocent. 19 U.2d at 286. 
The writ of habeas corpus is not a substitute for and 
cannot properly be treated as a regular appellate review. 
It is an extraordinary remedy which is properly invocable 
only when the court has no jurisdiction over the person 
or the offense or where the requirements of law have been 
so disregarded that the party is substantially and effec-
tively denied the due process of law, or where some fact 
is shown that it would be unconscionable not to reexamine 
the conviction. If the contention of error is something 
which is known or should be known to the party at the 
time the judgment was entered, it must be reviewed in a 
manner and within the time permitted by regular pre-
scribed procedure or the judgment becomes final and is not 
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subject to further attack except in some unusual circurn. 
stances as we have mentioned above. 
In the case of Sullivan v. Turner, ·---·---U.2d ________ , 448 
P.2d 907 (1968) the Utah Supreme Court said: 
The effort to upset this conviction in this manner 
must be considered in connection with our rules of 
procedure. When an accused is convicted of a 
crime, our law requires that any claimed error or 
defect be corrected by regular appeal within the 
time allowed by law, and if this is not done, the 
judgment becomes final. It can then be subjected 
to collateral attack by an extraordinary writ only 
when the interest of justice so demand because of 
some extraordinary circumstance or exigency: e.q., 
lack of jurisdiction, mistaken identify, where the 
requirements of law have been so ignored or dis-
torted that the accused has been deprived of "due 
process of law," or where there is shown to exist 
some other circumstances that it would be uncon-
scionable not to review the conviction. (Footnotes 
omitted.) 
See also Brown v. Turner, 21 U.2d 96, 440 P.2d 968 
(1969). Where it otherwise, the regular rules of procedure 
governing appeals and the limitations of time specified 
therein would be rendered impotent, Wise v. Turner, 21 
U.2d 101, 440 P.2d 971 (1968). 
As held by the court in those cases, the time for ap· , 
pellate review has long since passed and this is not a case ' 
in which the court did not have jurisdiction nor in which 
any of the other extraordinary circumstances have been 
shown. Respondent submits that the necessary subject mat· 
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ter is not in evidence in the case at bar and that therefore 
the denial of the writ should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
AN AGREEMENT TO DROP SOME CHARGES 
AGAINST THE PETITIONER IN RETURN FOR HIS 
PLEA OF GUILTY TO THE CHARGE OF ROBBERY 
WAS NOT IN AND OF ITSELF MENTAL COERCION. 
THE PETITIONER HA'S FAILED TO SUSTAIN THE 
BURDEN OF PROOF THAT HE IS BEING DE-
TAINED AS THE RESULT OF MENTALLY 
COERCED PLEA OF GUILTY. 
It is important to point out at the onset that the peti-
tioner does not allege mentally coercive tactics other than 
if he would plead guilty to the charge of robbery the state 
would not file the charge of attempted escape and de-
struction of state property. As expressed by the Honorable 
Bryant H. Croft sitting at the hearing on the petition, this 
in and of itself does not amount to mental coercion. 
A holding to the effect that it was such would deprive 
not only the state of a valuable tool in the prosecution of 
criminals, but would further deprive many violators of the 
law of a means of having the harshness of the law 
ameliorated in the form of a lessor punishment than that 
to which they could rightfully be subjected. The defendant 
was free to refuse the o'ffer of the state and defend him-
self against all charges. The decision was one of strategy 
which is presented to every accused in proceeding with the 
defense of his own innocence. In this respect, it is important 
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to note that the petitioner's counsel after having evaluated 
the facts and the law involved recommended that the de-
fendants in this case plead guilty. It would be unjust for 
this court to hold that as a matter of due process and pro-
cedure, that counsel in future cases defending those ac-
cused of crimes could not recommend such a plea because 
of the fact that in this cas~ the petitioner claims such ad-
vice amounted to or dided in a mental coercion. Respondent 
submits that neither it nor this court should be prepared to 
admit that this is or should be the law. 
The petitioner has the burden of showing by clear and 
convincing proof that he has been denied some fundamental 
constitutionally protected right in order to justify the issu-
ance of the extraordinary writ of habeas corpus. McGuffey 
v. Turner, 18 U.2d 354, 423 P.2d 166 (1967). All 
that was presented in the hearing below was the 
testimony of the petitioner and his partner in crime, 
Charles Meredith, to the effect that the agreement pre-
sented to them by the state along with the advise of their 
attorney runounted to tactics which constituted mental 
coercion. 
In Dexter v. Crouse, 192 Kan. 151, 386 P.2d 262 (1963), 
the court held: 
It is presumed an attorney appointed to represent 
an accused in a criminal case discharged all duties 
supposed of him by our statute and this presump-
tion is not overcome by the uncorroborated state-
ments of the petitioner in a habeas corpus proceed-
ing. 
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The court stated further: 
The unsupported and uncorroborated statements 
of the petition in a habeas corpus proceeding do 
not susta:in the burden of proof or justify the 
granting of a writ where the judgment rendered is 
regular on its face and entitled to a presumption of 
regularity and validity. 
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Sullivan v. 
Turner, supra, stated: 
It should be pointed out that there is ·a basic fallacy 
in the propositions urged by the petitioner: He 
assumes that the trial court was obliged to believe 
his evidence and draw conclusions favorable to him 
therefrom. The law is to the contrary. Petitions in 
habeas corpus and coram nobis are generally re-
garded as being analagous procedurally to civil 
proceedings. The petitioner has the burden of per-
suading the trial court by perponderance of 
evidence facts which will entitle him to relief. 
When the trial judge has made findings of facts 
and entered judgment thereon, they are entitled to 
the presumption of correctness on appeal the evi-
dence is surveyed in the light favorable to them; 
and if there is any reasonable basis in the evidence 
to support them, they will not be overturned. (Foot-
notes omitted.) 
Respondent submits that the appellant has not sustained 
his burden of showing that there was a mentally coerced 
plea and further submits that there is more than reasonable 
basis in the evidence to support the denial of the petition 
for habeas corpus. 
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POINT III 
THE POINT RAISED BY APPELLANT OF LACK 
OF COMPETENT REPRESENT A TI ON IS NOT PROP-
ERLY BEFORE THE COURT ON APPEAL. 
In petitioner's brief submitted on appeal, it is now his 
conter .. tion that the court-appointed counsel was negligent 
insofar as to be incompetent 'in rendering appellant repre-
sentation at the time of the guilty plea and as such the 
defendant was denied the effective representation of 
counsel. This contention was not raised at the hearing be-
low and the evidence introduced there was only the state-
ments of the petitioner and his co-defendant to the effect 
that they met with their counsel only briefly. Judge Croft 
at the hearing below stated: 
Well, in the Lonnie Strong case I don't think that 
there is any showing by clear and convincing 
evidence that there was a mentally coerced plea of 
guilty to the charge of armed robbery. I think that's 
the 'Only point raised in this habeas corpus petition 
and for that reason the petition of Lonnie 'Strong 
for the issuance of writ of habeas corpus is denied. 
(T.23) 
The petitioner cannot now raise issues for the first time 
on appeal 'and to do so would amount to a travesty of the 
rules of procedure. Dodge v. Turner, ________ U.2d ________ , 445 P.2d 
707 (1968). See also Wood v. Turner, 19 U.2d 284, 431 P.2d 
121 (1967). 
POINT IV 
THIS COURT IS NOT THE COMPETENT COURT 
TO ENTERTAIN THE QUESTION OF THE DE-
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g 
TAINER ALLEGING ESCA'PE FROM THE KANSAS 
STATE PENETENTIARY. 
The petitioner has alleged that there is an unlawful 
detainer against him from the State of Kansas for escape 
from prison. With regards to this escape, he alleges that he 
was illegally detained in Kan!'as as the result of failure to 
properly inform him of his constitutional rights and pro-
vide counsel. This issue was properly stricken by the court 
below at the time of a pretrial hearing on the habeas corpus 
petition and defense counsel properly did not raise this 
matter at the time of the hearing (T.15). 
It is apparent that the basic principle of law th'at one 
state will not attempt to enforce the criminal laws of 
another is present here. This issue can best be settled in 
the courts o·f Kans'as at such time as the petitioner has paid 
his debt to society in this state and returns to the State of 
Kansas and applies to their court for whatever relief he may 
be entitled to. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner has failed in his burden to sustain by clear 
and convincing evidence that his plea of guilty to the 
charge of robbery was coerced. Peltitioner h'as further 
failed in his burden to show that the agreement to not file 
other charges against him in return for the plea of guilty 
to the charge of robbery was in and of itself mental 
coercion. The other points raised by appellant in his 
petition are not properly before the court. For these reasons 
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it is therefore submitted that the judgment of the lower 
court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
LAUREN N. BEASLEY 
Assistant Attorney General 
JOSEPH P. McCARTHY 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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